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PrisonsThe paper presents the results of a Longitudinal Lab-in-the-Field Experiment implemented
between September 2015 and July 2016 performed in two State Prisons in California (USA)
to measure change in prosocial preferences. A subset of eligible inmates willing to under-
take GRIP (Guiding Rage Into Power) program, were randomly assigned to it. The paper
tests whether the participation to this program (used as a treatment in the experiments)
affects prosocial preferences of participants, with specific reference to trust. The results
of a Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation procedure show that trust significantly
increased in GRIP participants compared to the control group. This result is robust to alter-
native estimation techniques and to the inclusion of an endogenous behavioral measure of
altruism.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
A long debate persists in Economics on whether the discipline, by focusing on decisions and actions of rational actors,
should abide by the principle of methodological individualism by which ‘‘all explanations must run in terms of the actions
and reactions of individuals” (Arrow, 1994, p. 1). Most economic models also assume stable exogenous preferences since
‘‘without these assumptions, one cannot infer the causal connection between changes in opportunity sets and predicted
changes in choices” (Dasgupta, Gangadharan, Maitra, &Mani, 2017, p. 17). Either or both of assumptions have been repeatedly
challenged throughout the decades – from Veblen (1899) to Tarde (1902); from Hirschman (1984) to Bowles (1998) in the
attempt to consider individuals as embedded in a socio-cultural environment and influenced by their relational networks.
Some recent approaches (notably arising from Behavioral Economics) have stressed the effects of forces outside the indi-
viduals which may shape their decisions and actions away from individualistic maximization procedures. In particular, Hoff
and Stiglitz (2016) distinguish 3 types of economic literature: ‘‘(1) standard economics with rational actors, who have stable,
exogenous preferences; (2) behavioral economics with quasi-rational actors, who make seemingly inconsistent choices; and
(3) behavioral economics with enculturated actors, who have endogenous preferences, perception, and cognition” (Hoff &
Stiglitz, 2016, pp. 27–28, our italics). The literature records many Lab Experiments highlighting the existence of quasi-
rational actors and providing evidence of priming and framing phenomena (based on influences in the moment of decision),
whereas there are few Field and/or Lab-in-the-Field Experiments exploring decisions and actions of enculturated actors,
measuring the potentially durable impact of experience and exposure phenomena on their behaviors. Experience and
exposure require actors to be observed in real life situations, where decisions are influenced by social identities, peer-
effects, world-views and narratives.
90 M.A. Maggioni et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 64 (2018) 89–104This paper aims at contributing to this strand of literature by testing whether the participation to an offender account-
ability program (GRIP1), run by the US-based NGO Insight-Out, significantly changes prosocial attitudes (trust and altruism2) of
violent crime offenders detained in two Californian state prisons. Changing preferences enhancing prosocial behavior of long-
term prisoners is particularly difficult since, as shown by the literature (Haney, 2003), time spent in prison negatively affects
inmates ability of trusting and engaging in enduring relationships. Our empirical results are in line with such claim by showing
that trust and altruism decreased in prisoners not attending the GRIP program (i.e. in our control groups); however, the decrease
of the relevant indicators is not statistically significant.
As outlined in the program’s website, ‘‘the 10 months GRIP program functions as a peer education model where experi-
enced students co-facilitate the classes and mentor newer students. The program employs a methodology that is called
‘normative culture’ wherein the students cultivate intrinsic motivation by being actively involved in both setting and enforc-
ing the standards and norms that are integral to the course”.3 Thus GRIP may well qualify as an ideal test-bed for assessing the
effects of experience and exposure in changing social preferences.
The way Insight-Out administers the program particularly fits the requirements for an experimental setting. The NGO’s
limited capacity (until 2016 Insight-Out has been able to manage only one GRIP class of about 25 inmates per prison each
year) allows for the implementation of a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment4 involving 42 treated (inmates participant to GRIP) and
38 controls (inmates not attending the program), in two Californian State prisons. All 80 inmates were surveyed twice, the first
time before the beginning of GRIP and the second time about ten months later (after the end of the program). The experimental
protocol, designed to run a panel data Difference-in-Differences analysis, envisaged a set of behavioral games, devised to elicit
prosocial behavior (and in particular trust and altruism) and a series of questions based on a set of validated psychological scales
of forgiveness and self-forgiveness.5
The novelty of our contribution is threefold:
1. Longitudinal analysis. We implemented a longitudinal study in the framework of prosocial behavioral games, concerning
the change of prosocial attitudes and preferences over time, with reference to trust and altruism, experienced by people
exposed to a ‘‘rehab” program. While longitudinal studies – according to Chuang and Schechter (2015, pp. 153–154) have
been extensively used to test the stability of risk and time preferences, changes in social preferences have been investi-
gated by a handful of papers. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, only one paper (Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz,
& Wichardt, 2015) specifically uses the trust game in a longitudinal analysis, though as an indicator of risk attitudes;
while another paper (Brosig-Koch, Riechmann, & Weimann, 2017) uses a Dictator Game in a longitudinal analysis whose
main focus is the learning process of a quasi-rational actor.6
2. Experience and Exposure rather than Priming and Framing. Our Lab-in-the-Field Experiment, designed to measure the
changes in trust and altruism displayed by a group of Californian inmates, is specifically designed to test the effect of
the exposure to a different environment (the GRIP program as opposed to the prisons general environment) and on
the experience of a strong sense of collective identity.
3. Non-student population. While conventional Lab Experiments use university students as targeted population, in this paper,
we applied a behavioral economics set of games within an environment (state prisons) rarely investigated by the behav-
ioral economics literature to a non-standard adult population (prison inmates) in which, as described by Hardin (2002)
and Haney (2003), distrust among prisoners is often encouraged by corrections officers and managers to strengthen their
control capacity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the main features of the GRIP program, highlighting its core targets;
Section 3 presents the research design and experimental methods; Section 4 presents the methodology to estimate the Aver-
age effect of the Treatment on the Treated (ATT); Section 5 provides results and robustness checks, and Section 6 provides a
discussion of the main findings and conclusions.
2. Guiding Rage Into Power (GRIP): outline of the rehabilitation program
Jacques Verduin has been running the GRIP (Guiding Rage Into Power) Program in San Quentin Prison (California, USA)
since 2011,7 the founder of Insight-Out, an NGO based in the San Francisco’s area. GRIP originates from its founder’s vision that1 GRIP is the acronym for Guiding Rage Into Power an offender accountability program which is currently administered in seven Californian prisons and
involves around 500 inmates. See more details in Section 2.
2 In a somehow similar experimental setting, Blattman, Jamison, & Sheridan (2017) investigates the ‘‘malleability” of a number of noncognitive skills and
preferences in criminally engaged adults.
3 http://www.insight-out.org/index.php/programs/grip-program.
4 Following the taxonomy proposed by Harrison and List (2004), a Lab-Like Field or Lab-in-the-Field experiment involves participants drawn from the field
and asks them ‘‘to perform laboratory tasks that are not part of their day-to-day environment” (Viceisza, 2016, p. 836).
5 The forgiveness-related questions are not analyzed in this paper due to their different nature and scope. Therefore, we have postponed their illustration to a
future work.
6 Both papers are based on Lab Experiments performed on university students. See point 3 of this list.
7 His experience with prison programs is much longer: in 1997, he founded the Insight Prison Project (IPP), pioneering innovative in-prison rehabilitation
programs designed to create transformational change among prisoners at California’s San Quentin State Prison.
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gram”, according to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).9 GRIP aims at providing inmates with
the skills to undo and prevent violent behavior so to become ‘‘agents of change”, i.e. ‘‘people with skills to defuse conflicts
around them”.10 In particular, the program focuses on the origins of behaviors and habits that are conducive to crime, with
the specific purpose of undoing ‘‘the characteristic destructive behavioral patterns (. . .) that lead to transgressions”.10 The pro-
gram usually spans over an ‘‘academic year”, roughly ten months long (between September and July) and develops through
weekly/fortnightly lessons, each one focused on a specific topic, aiming at (1) stopping violent behavior, (2) cultivating mind-
fulness, (3) achieving emotional intelligence and (4) understanding victim impact. GRIP targets unobservable behavioral traits,
possibly affecting other-regarding preferences and beliefs. For this reason, the program is particularly suited to the experimen-
tal analysis we devised: neither trust, nor altruism are explicitly ‘‘taught” during GRIP classes, hence we expect experimental
outcomes not to be driven by inmates’ lip service to the explicit program content.11 However, both trust and altruism can
be indirectly affected by the program and the implementation of behavioral games is especially devised to elicit prosocial atti-
tudes by the observed choices in a given set of tasks.
GRIP classes are held through a variety of didactic methods, spanning from traditional frontal lessons, to group-works and
intervention of external guests.12 Great emphasis and efforts are spent on creating a strong group identification, so that GRIP
participants realize and experience that they are not alone, but part of a community that is pursuing the same objectives.13
Every cohort of GRIP participants is named ‘‘Tribe” followed by a number that consists of how many years all the men (new
participants as well as co-facilitators) have been incarcerated in any type of correctional facility: from juvenile detention to
county jails to state prisons.14 The inmates are also asked to work on their own or in small groups on specific assignments,
in order to keep track of their progresses in achieving the four above mentioned goals. At the end of the course, a Graduation
ceremony is held, involving inmates, relatives and the prison’s warden. During the Graduation ceremony inmates, or ‘‘students”
as they are called throughout the program, receive their title and diploma of ‘‘peace maker”.
The GRIP program integrates three principal modalities: Instruction functions as a means to teach the information that is
crucial to the programs theoretical framework. Process refers to the various exercises employed to work with a deep layer of
emotional material that must be acknowledged, expressed and integrated in order for insight and understanding to occur.
Practice anchors the acquired insights into a durable behavior by spending time learning how to embody what has been
learned.
As other programs informed by the principles of Socio-Emotional Learning (SEL) and Cognitive Behavioural Theory (CBT),
GRIP makes use of symbols, language, schemes that belong to street if not gang culture to shape inmates social identity and
behavior: the Tribe is in some way an inverted or ‘‘flipped” and therefore positive version of a gang, in which tight interper-
sonal bonds are instrumental to the diffusion of a culture of accountability and peace as opposed to irresponsibility and vio-
lence, enhancing the construction of a collective identity that in turn promotes pro-social behavior (Blattman et al., 2017;
Feigenberg, Field, & Pande, 2010; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016; Paulle, 2017).
3. Experimental design
Before dealing with the description of the experimental design, it is worthwhile stressing that this paper does not directly
aim at testing the impact or effectiveness of the program in reaching its core targets; but rather uses behavioral economics
games, within an experimental setting, to measure effects of the program on changing inmates’ prosocial preferences and
attitudes. In particular, we focus on generalized trust, for two reasons: firstly, it is widely acknowledged (Fukuyama,
1995; Grimalda & Mittone, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Warren, 1999)
as one of the ingredients of well-functioning societies, efficient and growing economic systems and effective participative
institutions; secondly, prosocial attitudes usually seriously decline in prison since distrust is often promoted in prisons as
a mean to facilitate control, by breaking loyalty links and interpersonal relationships among inmates. Therefore, the time
spent in prison affects inmates’ ability of trusting and engage in prosocial relationship. Haney (2003, p. 44) put it sharply:
Because many prisons are clearly dangerous places from which there is no exit or escape, prisoners learn quickly to
become hypervigilant and ever-alert for signs of threat or personal risk. Because the stakes are high, and because there
are people in their immediate environment poised to take advantage of weakness or exploit carelessness or inattention,
interpersonal distrust and suspicion often result (Our italics).8 A summary of both vision and mission of Insight-Out can found on the NGO’s website. See https://goo.gl/uMFgna for further details.
9 An independent presentation of the programs features can be found in Paulle (2017).
10 See http://insight-out.org/index.php/programs/grip-program.
11 No reference to trust and altruism/generosity can be found in the final ‘‘Pledge”, signed by each inmate taking part in GRIP.
12 For a detailed presentation on how the GRIP program works, refer to: https://vimeo.com/63489782.
13 A recent analysis of the effectiveness of a somehow similar program (called STYL) in changing a series of noncognitive skills and preferences of criminally
engaged men in Liberia can be found in Blattman et al. (2017).
14 In a given class of around 30 men, the total often climbs higher than 600 years. In this particular way each cohort obtains its unique group identification, its
name, that inmates often use to recall for years after the of end of the program. See Paulle (2017) for more details.
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GRIP does not target ‘‘specific” kinds of inmates, being virtually open to any inmate who applies. Before starting each
program, Insight-Out offers a program orientation day in each prison to illustrate the main features of GRIP to all the
potentially interested inmates. After the presentation of GRIP, inmates are asked to signal their interest and take an inter-
view aimed at identifying mental disabilities or other severely impairing conditions. The actual number of selected par-
ticipants (usually around 25 per prison) depends on both the NGO capacity constraints and prison security rules. This
feature of the enrollment process particularly fits the methodological requirements of a pre-/post-treatment research
design. The treatment (i.e. the participation to the program) was randomly assigned to inmates that signaled their interest
and passed the interview, up to the filling of all available places. The random assignment of the treatment has been imple-
mented according to the following procedure: after the motivational open day, Insight-Out provided us with information
about the inmates (identified by an anonymous code) interested in taking part into GRIP. The resulting pool of inmates
was randomly assigned to either treatment or control by balancing for ethnic group, to comply with CDCR requirements
for prison programs and with GRIP’s aim.
Henceforth, inmates enrolled in GRIP will be referred to as the ‘‘Treated” group (T); inmates who asked to enter the pro-
gram but were not enrolled because of capacity constraints will be referred to as the ‘‘Waiting list” group (W); since, if the
program is repeated in the same prison, they will have a chance to attend the program in the subsequent years. Finally,
inmates who attended the orientation day, but did not show up for the interview, as the ‘‘No interview” group (N).
The experiment has been actually conducted on 80 inmates of two Californian State Prisons (Avenal and Mule Creek),15
operated by the CDCR, according to the above mentioned three sample of inmates (T, W, N).16 Since the perspective of this
research especially focuses on changes in prosocial preferences and attitudes, we devised a longitudinal study by administering
the same questionnaires twice to each inmate: the first time in September 2015, before the start of the treatment (i.e. the GRIP
program), the second time in July 2016 after the end of the program. The first survey measures the initial level of the parameters
of interest; the second survey measures whether a significant change in the parameters occurred after the treatment.
3.2. Incentivized tasks: Trust Game and Dictator Game
In order to assess whether GRIP affects the prosocial preferences and attitudes of inmates, we devised an experimental
setting that included two incentivized tasks,17 a Dictator Game and a Trust Game, that were administered separately, after
instructions had been read loud and clarification questions have been answered.18
In the Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) a Proponent is provided with an exogenous endowment (usu-
ally a fixed monetary amount), he/she is matched to an anonymous partner who has received no endowment, and his/her
choice consists of how to split the endowment between himself and the partner. Within the game theory framework, assum-
ing a Proponent with self-regarding preferences, the Dictator Game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the Proponent
maximizes his/her payoff by keeping all the endowment and sending 0 to the partner. Therefore, deviation from the selfish
equilibrium solution in the Dictator Game are used to measure empathy, altruism and/or pure generosity (Camerer, 2003;
Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Guala & Mittone, 2010). In the Trust Game, also known as Investment Game (Berg,
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988), a Proponent is provided with an exogenous endowment, and he/she is
matched to an anonymous partner who has received no endowment. The Proponent’s decision now concerns whether and
how much of his/her endowment to send to the anonymous partner; the Proponent is also informed that the experimenter
will multiply (triple) any amount sent. The Respondent, once has received the total transfer (the amount sent by the Propo-
nent, duly multiplied) is then told to choose if, and how much of the total amount received, to send back to the Proponent.
Therefore, the final payoff of the Proponent will be equal to the initial endowment, less the amount sent to the Respondent,
plus the amount sent back by the Respondent to the Proponent. This game has a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
in which the Proponent maximizes his/her payoff by keeping all the endowment and sending 0 to the partner: in fact, solving
by backward induction, since a selfish Respondent has no reason to send back any strictly positive amount, the Proponent
maximizes his/her payoff by keeping the entire initial endowment. Sending a positive share of the initial endowment to
anonymous partners signals agents propensity to interact with unknown partners, providing a proxy for generalized trust
(Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003; Johnson & Mislin, 2011), that has been defined as ‘‘the deliberate willingness of a decision
maker to making himself vulnerable to the actions of another party” (Sutter & Kocher, 2007, p. 365).
Due to the impossibility of dealing with monetary payoffs (according to CDRC rules) we devised an alternative form of
reward. After extensive consultation with the staff of NGOs working within prisons in the USA, we decided to use dehydrated15 In these two prisons GRIP is the only available offender accountability program, thus, by definition, we do not have to worry about possible spillovers
arising across different programs.
16 Given the small size of the W group compared with the T group, in the paper we also include a wider control group, obtained as the sum of W + N groups as
a robustness check. This procedure is justified by the absence of significant statistical differences between W and N with respect to covariates and outcome
variables (see Table 2 for details).
17 As already mentioned in Section 1, since this research is part of a broader project, the experiment also included a series of questions based on a set of
validated psychological scales of forgiveness (Chiaramello, Sastre, & Mullet, 2008; Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004), and self-forgiveness (Pelucchi, Paleari,
Regalia, & Fincham, 2013) that are not analyzed int this paper.
18 For details on the experimental procedure see Appendix E: Supplementary materials.
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‘‘use value” (soup like) and the ‘‘exchange value” (soup value) that inmates attach to soups.
3.3. Procedures
The experiment has been implemented in paper-and-pencil through visits to both prisons in September 2015 (before the
start of the program) and in July 2016 (after GRIP Graduation took place). The experiment has been administered by six stu-
dents/interviewers purposely recruited in a local Community College.20 Interviewers were thus independent both from
Insight-Out and CDCR, to minimize the risk of possible strategic choices on the inmates sides. In both prisons, the same proce-
dure has been applied, as follows.
Inmates were gathered in a room, equipped with tables and chairs, and sat down at an adequate distance from each other.
The interviewers read aloud the instructions of each game before administering it, making sure that everyone in the room
understood it well.21 Inmates were informed that only one of the games would have been randomly drawn through the toss of a
fair plastic coin at the end of the experiment session and rewarded: in this way, each inmate had the incentive to maximize his
outcome in both games.
Both behavioral games were played in an anonymous double blind setting. Inmates were randomly assigned a code;
Insight-Out staff held records about the matching between individual names and codes, but could not access individual out-
come data (i.e. games results); the research team could access individual outcome data, matched with anonymous codes, but
could not access individual names.
In both the Dictator and Trust games inmates were told they would have been randomly matched with anonymous part-
ners. To administer the payment of the payoffs, we devised the following protocol. Once an inmate submitted his paper
sheets,22 an interviewer asked him to pick one out of five ‘‘reward booklets”, randomly taken from a pile. The booklets included
the anonymous partner’s choices to be matched the inmate’s decision in the Trust Game. These booklets contained the outcome
of the choices of University non-academic staff (janitors, wardens, cleaners, cooks, etc.), that were asked to play the Trust Game
as Respondent in a previous experiment run by the research team. Therefore, all the choices included in the booklet were gen-
erated by real people, and the inmates were aware of this fact.23 The inmate was then asked to toss a plastic coin to select the
game (either Dictator or Trust) to be rewarded and his choice in the randomly selected game was matched with the partner’s
choice, if needed.24 Finally, the resulting payoff was paid in soups. On average, inmates earned 5.7 dried soups (modal value 5);
each inmate took around twenty-five minutes to complete the experimental session, administration of the rewards included.
4. Analysis of the treatment effect
4.1. Estimation technique
The experimental framework allowed to perform a Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis in which the change regis-
tered by the T group was compared to the change recorded by the W group (in order to control for the self-selection related
to the individual willingness a/o motivation to join the program) and, more generally, to the change of a wider ‘‘control
group” obtained by pooling inmates belonging to N andW groups (N + W). The average effect of the treatment on the treated
(ATT) is the effect of GRIP on the inmates taking part into the program.
DID allows to test the ATT in a pre-/post-treatment setting, by controlling for possible confounding factors, including
fixed time-invariant individual characteristics. Formally, the effect of a treatment (Treat) on an outcome (Y) can be tested











25 TheYit ¼ aþ bTreatit þ cPostit þ qðPost  TreatÞit þ dXi þ it ð1Þ
where the subscripts i and t respectively refer to prisoners and periods (surveys); a represent the constant term; Post is the
time dummy, taking value 1 for observations belonging to the second survey and zero otherwise; Treat is the treatment
dummy; Xi are individual inmates’ characteristics; and it is the usual error term, while b; c;q and d are the parameters
to be estimated. The ATT effect is estimated by the coefficient q. Formally, being g the groups in our sample, namely treated
(T), waiting (W), and the wider control group (N + W) and t the two surveys (1 and 2), then q is defined as follows25:ydrated soups are highly valuable in maximum security prisons as they allow inmates to have a meal in the relative privacy of their cell. Moreover there
otal evidence that these items are stored and traded with other inmates, thus they can be thought as imperfect substitutes of money in prison. Recent
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ilan College, Gilroy, CA.
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y the Trust Game needs information about the partner’s choice.
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A DID can be estimated in a regression framework by creating dummy variables for g and t. In this way it is possible to
estimate a model that fully takes into account a set of possible confounding factors.
4.2. Data and variables
Eq. (1) is applied to the analysis of both the outcome of the Dictator Game and the Trust Game. In the Dictator Game, the
outcome (i.e. the number of soups sent to the Respondent) is transformed into an indicator of the relative endowment
(within the range 0–1) that the inmate shares with the anonymous partner. Analogously, the Trust Game yields a discrete
outcome expressed in number of soups (between 1 and 10) that has been re-scaled in relative terms, into the 0–1 range.
The benchmark model of our analysis includes control variables related to the following individual characteristics that
could affect the inmate’s attitude to trust other people:
 age declared by inmate as of July 2016 (age);
 a dummy variable, coded 1 if inmates was not involved in a stable relationship, i.e. whether he was not married, sepa-
rated/divorced, engaged or widowed (single);
 a control for personal preferences for soups (soup like);
 a control for the value of soups as means of exchange, independently of individual tastes (soup value).
In an extended specification, we also included dummies for ethnic identity, to control for possible cross-ethnic hetero-
geneity that could affect the propensity to trust an anonymous partner.26
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the individual characteristics of the treated and of the two control groups and
N + W; Table 2 records mean comparison tests for all three samples. In particular, the last three columns show that no sig-
nificant differences occur between Treated and control groups on the main covariates, with the sole exception of soup like.
Since the literature (e.g. Camerer, 2003; Johnson & Mislin, 2011) suggests that the outcome of a Trust Game can be actu-
ally driven by pure altruism rather than trust, in order to estimate the effect of pure altruism on trust, we provide an
extended version of our benchmark model that also includes the outcome of the Dictator Game as measured in the first
survey.
Finally, since the experiment is repeated twice, we take into account possible autocorrelation of the error term at the indi-
vidual level. To tackle this issue, all models are estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the inmate level.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Main results
Fig. 1 illustrates the distributions of the inmates’ choices in the Trust Game, by survey and treatment group. While the W
control group in the upper and lower panel report statistically indistinguishable distributions across waves (the Kruskal-
Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions, with a p-value of .256), the distribution for the Treated
group is clearly different in wave 1 and 2 of the survey (according to a Kruskal-Wallis test, with a p-value .066. Almost iden-
tical results are obtained by using a Wilkoxon rank-sum test. Table 3 reports the main statistics for both Dictator and Trust
Game by group and wave.
Table 4 reports the results of the benchmark models’ estimations: model (1) shows that, after the completion of the GRIP
Program, the Treated inmates significantly increased the fraction sent to the anonymous partner by 0.212, as shown by the
ATT coefficient in Table 4 (corresponding to a 20 per cent increase of the initial amount, given that soups were only available
as integer numbers). This finding is robust to the identification of alternative control groups, as shown in model (2): the size
of the two coefficients is substantially comparable, since both can be converted into an average increase of about 2 soups.27
The ATT coefficient is higher than the minimum detectable effect computed through a power analysis based on established val-
ues for both average and standard deviation (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), see Figs. D.1 and D.2 in the Appendix.
As far as covariates are concerned,28 Trust is negatively associated with age, although the size of the coefficient is very
small. Furthermore, single is highly significant and negatively associated with Trust, suggesting that the absence of involve-
ment in a stable romantic relationship (either present or past, successful or unsuccessful) signals a less trustful attitude (in the
Sutter & Kocher, 2007 sense). The benchmark model’s estimations thus support the occurrence of a ‘‘trust-increasing” effect of
GRIP in participant inmates.nic group identities are self-reported by inmates by choosing among not mutually exclusive categories, hence all included in the model estimation,
om the US Census official definition of ethnic and racial groups as mandated by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 1997 standards. For
information see https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/meta/long_RHI225215.htm.
act – since dehydrated soups (the goods used in the actual experiment) are indivisible – the two coefficients may be interpreted as identical.
le 4 does not report further alternative specifications that include also the payoff earned in the first survey: this variable is not significant (see Appendix
B1), implying that the time interval between the two sessions is large enough to cancel out potential ‘‘memory effect” of the previous payoff.
Table 1
Summary of samples characteristics, at baseline.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
T Group
Age 42 43.86 9.03 22 59
Single 42 0.57 0.50 0 1
Soup like 41 5.44 3.08 1 10
Soup value 41 5.59 3.54 1 10
W Group
Age 22 47.59 8.63 30 63
Single 22 0.59 0.50 0 1
Soup like 22 7.64 2.77 1 10
Soup value 22 6.32 2.95 1 10
N + W Group
Age 38 47.00 9.42 26 63
Single 38 0.50 0.51 0 1
Soup like 38 7.26 2.83 1 10
Soup value 38 6.39 2.95 1 10
Table 2
T-tests, by treatment group at baseline.
Sample means Mean comparison T-tests
Variable T W N + W T/W T/N +W W/N
Age 43.86 47.59 47.00 3.734 3.143 1.403
Single 0.57 0.59 0.50 0.020 0.071 0.216
Soup like 5.44 7.64 7.26 2.197⁄⁄⁄ 1.824⁄⁄⁄ 0.886
Soup value 5.59 6.32 6.39 0.733 0.809 0.182
Ethnic groups
White 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.004 0.063 0.159
Native American/Alaska 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.017 0.013 0.011
Hawaiian Native/Pacific 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.041 0.010 0.074
Asian 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.041 0.036 0.011
Black/African American 0.33 0.45 0.34 0.121 0.009 0.267⁄
Hispanic/Latino 0.48 0.45 0.53 0.022 0.050 0.170
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
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game through a DID estimation. As models (3) and (4) in Table 4 show, the ATT coefficient is not significant in the benchmark
model for the two control groups.29 Thus, the extended specification of the DID model presented in Table 5 treats altruism as
an endogenously determined individual attitude and includes it among the covariates at the value observed at the first survey.
Since the observed outcome of a Trust Game can be driven by multiple motivations, such as other-regarding preferences,
and beliefs over the trustworthiness of the anonymous partner (Fehr, 2009; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, & Zingales, 2013), we
estimate the effect of pure altruism on trust (Rabin, 1993) by including the outcome of a Dictator Game. In this way,
we devise an extended model in which an endogenously determined attitude of the participants is included as a covariate
for trust.
In the extended specification, as shown in Table 5, models (1)–(4) include the same covariates as in Table 4 as well as the
endogenous proxy for altruism; models (5)–(8) also include dummy variables for self-reported ethnic identities. For all spec-
ifications, the table reports the coefficients for both the subsample of motivated inmates (W) and the wider control group
(N + W). All specifications are estimated both through standard OLS, as common practice in the field, and through GLM
for the binomial family with a logit link function. The latter estimation technique has been implemented following the
suggestions by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), for bounded dependent variables.30 ATT, the Average Treatment effect on29 This result is robust for alternative model specifications, including an extended set of covariates to control for ethnicity, and no covariates at all.
Furthermore, both the Wilckoxon rank-sum and Kruskal-Wallis tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of altruism for Treated and Controls
are different across surveys. The power analysis based on average and standard deviation as in Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, and Magan (2004) implemented for
null effect in the Dictator Game shows a minimum detectable effect that is slightly larger that the estimated ATT coefficient, given our sample size. Thus we
may not observe a statistically significant treatment effect due to low statistical power.
30 In fact our dependent variable is the fraction of soups sent to the other person and is therefore constrained within the range 0–1. Some researchers
addressed this issue by implementing a Tobit model, but Papke and Wooldridge (1996) showed that censored regression techniques do not apply for variables
with infeasible values beyond the censoring point. Therefore, GLM models are included in the table as a robustness check.
0
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Share of endowment sent to the anonymous partner
Wave 2
Fig. 1. Trust Game: distribution of inmates’ choices.
Table 3
Summary statistics of Trust and Dictator.
Wave 1 Wave 2
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Treated group (T)
Trust 42 6.55 2.75 42 7.60 2.85
Dictator 42 6.57 2.51 42 7.19 2.75
Control group (W)
Trust 22 7.64 2.50 22 6.59 3.38
Dictator 22 6.95 2.34 22 6.27 3.12
Wider control group (N + W)
Trust 38 7.42 2.52 38 6.66 3.16
Dictator 38 6.89 2.49 38 6.34 2.76
96 M.A. Maggioni et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 64 (2018) 89–104the Treated, is always positive and significant and it is robust to different model specifications. The coefficient of altruism is
positive and significant, as expected.
In the extended version of the model reported on columns (5)–(8), none of the group dummies is significant, allowing to
exclude effects of ethnic differences on trust.31
One may raise concerns on whether inmates – despite being told they were matched each with a real person, who
had played, as a Respondent, the same game in a previously administered session, and whose answers were recorded in
the ‘‘reward booklet” – were actually believing to interact with real persons, rather than simulated ones. Previous behav-
ioral (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006) and neuroscience (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2003) studies show that people behave differently according to their beliefs about the nature of partners (real vs. sim-
ulated persons). Empirical evidence shows that being convinced of playing against a machine or a simulated person31 Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003, pp. 196–7) show that ‘‘Non-White participants exhibit less trust than whites in a mostly white environment”. In
our case, however, one should consider that the incarceration rate in the USA is higher for ethnic minorities. In an alternative model specification, not reported
here, we run the same models as in columns (1)–(4) including a single ethnic dummy for Non-White inmate: the coefficient is always never statistically
significant.
Table 4
Benchmark models’ results: Trust and Dictator, Difference-in-Differences.
Dep. Var: Trust Dictator
Control Group: W N + W W N +W
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATT 0.212⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄ 0.132 0.119
(0.087) (0.075) (0.090) (0.073)
Age 0.008⁄⁄⁄ 0.008⁄⁄⁄ 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Single 0.133⁄⁄ 0.146⁄⁄⁄ 0.127⁄⁄ 0.118⁄⁄
(0.059) (0.049) (0.053) (0.047)
Prison dummy 0.020 0.018 0.150⁄⁄⁄ 0.088⁄
(0.060) (0.054) (0.052) (0.050)
Soup value 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 126 158 126 158
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at prisoners’ level.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
Table 5
Augmented Trust results: Difference-in-Differences.
Dep. var.: Trust including altruism including altruism & ethnic groups
Control Group: W N +W W N + W
Model: OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ATT 0.212⁄⁄ 0.199⁄⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄ 0.171⁄⁄⁄ 0.212⁄⁄ 0.201⁄⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄ 0.172⁄⁄⁄
(0.087) (0.072) (0.075) (0.061) (0.090) (0.072) (0.077) (0.060)
Altruism 0.375⁄⁄⁄ 0.414⁄⁄⁄ 0.377⁄⁄⁄ 0.407⁄⁄⁄ 0.300⁄⁄ 0.343⁄⁄ 0.370⁄⁄⁄ 0.395⁄⁄⁄
(0.116) (0.123) (0.091) (0.101) (0.131) (0.143) (0.091) (0.105)
Age 0.006⁄ 0.006⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄ 0.006⁄ 0.007⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Single 0.122⁄⁄ 0.127⁄⁄ 0.138⁄⁄⁄ 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.140⁄⁄ 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.143⁄⁄⁄ 0.140⁄⁄⁄
(0.051) (0.053) (0.042) (0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046)
Prison dummy 0.024 0.036 0.038 0.045 0.013 0.011 0.024 0.027
(0.055) (0.058) (0.047) (0.049) (0.056) (0.059) (0.045) (0.048)
Soup value 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
White 0.071 0.069 0.043 0.046
(0.062) (0.065) (0.052) (0.059)
Native American/ 0.109 0.095 0.023 0.028
Alaska (0.099) (0.103) (0.074) (0.071)
Hawaiian Native/ 0.039 0.026 0.009 0.009
Pacific (0.135) (0.166) (0.113) (0.158)
Asian 0.015 0.033 0.020 0.043
(0.137) (0.133) (0.087) (0.105)
Black/ 0.079 0.083 0.079 0.074
African American (0.058) (0.068) (0.053) (0.065)
Hispanic/ 0.060 0.047 0.038 0.038
Latino (0.065) (0.071) (0.050) (0.058)
Observations 126 126 158 158 126 126 158 158
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.21
McFadden R-Sq. 0.29 0.12 0.31 0.13
AIC 1.009 0.974 1.086 1.037
BIC 516.7 695.2 490.0 666.8
Treatment and time dummies included. Clustered robust s.e. in parentheses.
OLS and GLM for the binomial family (link function: logit): for GLM models, the table reports marginal effects.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
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Table 6
Robustness check: Propensity Score Matching, dep. var.: trust.
Matching method: NNy Radiusy Kernel
(1) (2) (3)
ATT 0.188⁄⁄ 0.173⁄⁄ 0.109
(0.094) (0.082) (0.077)
T-stat 2.00 2.10 1.42
Observations 79 79 79
Controls 20 29 37
Treated 41 32 41
Note: Common support always requested; balancing property satisfied.
Covariates: Altruism, age, single, soup value, ethnic group dummies.
Standard errors (y) or Bootstrap standard errors () in parentheses.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
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hinder our results for two reasons: firstly, since our research design entails a DID, any potential downward bias occur-
ring in both surveys is eliminated by the estimation technique; secondly, any residual downward effect would a fortiori
strengthen our results.
5.2. Robustness checks
Another potential concern for the results shown in Table 5 is related to possible self-selection bias in the control
group. As a robustness check we provide a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure for the results. PSM is an
estimation technique to evaluate the effectiveness of treatment in observational studies, extensively used since the
seminal work by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The aim is to estimate ATT by comparing treated and controls, con-
ditioning on a set of relevant covariates (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In order to proceed with
the test we ignore the pre-/post- treatment design and consider only the outcomes of Trust in the second survey, by
conditioning them on inmates’ individual characteristics. The Propensity Score, i.e. the probability of being part of the
Treated group, is therefore calculated by balancing the same covariates that we include in extended model specifi-
cation (columns 5–8 in Table 5).32 By imposing ‘‘common support” on Treated and Control, the actual matching will
consider only Treated and Control with propensity scores within the range of the control group values. In this way,
potential outliers in the Treated group are ignored, and the estimated ATT is robust to potential unobserved self-
selection mechanisms.
Once the propensity score has been calculated33 and the balancing property successfully tested, the choice of the matching
algorithm is of pivotal importance since it affects both the bias and efficiency of the estimated ATT (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
For this reason, Table 6 reports the estimated ATT according to three alternative matching algorithms extensively applied in the
PSM literature, namely: 1-to-1 Nearest-Neighbor (NN), Radius Caliper and Kernel.34
Both models (1) and (2), shown in Table 6, report statistically significant ATT coefficients, very close to those estimated in
Table 5 (ranging from 0.17 to 0.19) and rely on Nearest Neighbour and Caliper Radius algorithms that are based on similar
procedures, to identify the most suitable observation in the control group for each treated one. These procedures are the
most straightforward application of PSM and allow to compare similar individuals. For sake of completeness, column (3)
in Table 6 reports the estimation of the ATT when the Kernel technique is applied. The lack of statistical significance in
the Kernel model estimation is likely to be driven by the fact that this technique uses all the available information to gen-
erate the counterfactual outcome for the treated, thus including also potential ‘‘bad matches”, i.e. controls with propensity
scores very far from the treated (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Therefore, PSM overall confirms and strengthens our main
result, supporting the evidence that trust, as measured by the fraction of soups sent to an anonymous partner in the Trust
Game, increased in inmates participating to GRIP.
6. Conclusions
The present study tests whether GRIP, a specific offender accountability program for long-term sentenced inmates,
implemented in two Californian State Prisons (Avenal and Mule Creek), changes the prosocial behavioral attitudes of32 Due to the limited size of the sample, the prison dummy has been not included since it would have further reduced the number of available propensity
scores for the matching. All other covariates are indeed included in the propensity score estimation.
33 The results of the logit estimation are shown in the Appendix. See Table C1.
34 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a survey of pros and cons of different matching algorithms.
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a period of 10 months with a specific focus on altruism and trust. We chose to use the Trust Game since trust, com-
monly being acknowledged as an ingredient of the ‘‘cement of society” (Elster, 1989) and a lubricant of a social system
(Arrow, 1974), it is hindered by long periods of incarceration (Haney, 2003), thus seriously questioning the rehabilitation
function of the prison system. By focusing our analysis on trust, while controlling for altruism, we were able to effec-
tively measure the effects of a 10 months exposure to the GRIP program in changing inmates’ self-perceptions, social
attitudes and preferences.
The research protocol envisaged administering twice a questionnaire including a set of behavioral situations (‘‘games”),
widely used in the experimental and behavioral economics literature, namely the Dictator Game (Kahneman et al., 1986) and
the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995), to 80 inmates, 42 treated (enrolled in the program) and 38 controls. The questionnaire was
administered once before the start of the program; the second time at the end of the program.
A DID estimation procedure shows that trust significantly increased in GRIP participants compared to the control group.
This result is robust to alternative estimation techniques and to the inclusion of an endogenous behavioral measure of altru-
ism (measured by a Dictator Game).
On the one hand, the direct empirical results of the paper – based on a innovative longitudinal analysis conducted on
a sample of non standard agents – support the claim that an offender accountability program, such as GRIP, produces
beneficial effects on the inmates’ prosocial preferences and attitudes, in addition and beyond its primary aims. On
the other hand, the more general intuition that can be drawn from our analysis suggests that ‘‘exposure to a given social
context shapes who people are” (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016, p.26). Social contexts are the products and the repository of pre-
vious social, economic and psychological activities. ‘‘From this perspective, the situation, the context, or the environment
then is not just an overlay on a set of basic psychological processes that provides the content for the processes. Instead
(. . .) people think and feel and act in culture-specific (. . .) ways that are shaped by (. . .) meanings, practices, products,
and institutions.” (DiMaggio & Markus, 2010, p. 348). Therefore, programs like GRIP can be adopted as an effective
instrument to or strengthen, in a relatively short span of time, prosocial preferences, attitudes and behaviors in inmates,
while they are still in prison. Further they can also facilitate the rehabilitation process, in the long term, by fostering
inmates’ reintegration and re-socialization in their communities, thus potentially contributing to the reduction of
recidivism.
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Appendix A. Correlation matrix
See Table A1.Table A1
Pairwise correlation of main variables.





Single 0.234 0.002 0.114
(0.003) (0.982) (0.151)
Soup like 0.027 0.119 0.206 0.118
(0.738) (0.135) (0.009) (0.139)
Soup value 0.076 0.14 0.005 0.202 0.350
(0.345) (0.079) (0.952) (0.011) (0.000)
P-values in parentheses.Appendix B. Further robustness checks
See Tables B1–B3.
Table B1
Difference-in-Differences, same models as in Table 5, including wave 1 payoffs.
Dep. Var.: Trust including altruism including altruism & ethnic groups
Control Group: W N + W W N + W
Model: OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM
(3) (4) (1) (2) (7) (8) (5) (6)
ATT 0.212⁄⁄ 0.199⁄⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄ 0.171⁄⁄⁄ 0.212⁄⁄ 0.200⁄⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄ 0.172⁄⁄⁄
(0.088) (0.071) (0.076) (0.060) (0.090) (0.070) (0.077) (0.060)
Altruism 0.349⁄⁄⁄ 0.396⁄⁄⁄ 0.373⁄⁄⁄ 0.410⁄⁄⁄ 0.270⁄⁄ 0.311⁄⁄ 0.366⁄⁄⁄ 0.396⁄⁄⁄
(0.119) (0.125) (0.090) (0.101) (0.131) (0.144) (0.089) (0.103)
Payoff 0.008 0.010⁄ 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.011⁄ 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
..
.
Observations 126 126 158 158 126 126 158 158
Individuals 63 79 63 79
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.25
McFadden R-Squared 0.30 0.12 0.31 0.14
AIC 1.016 0.981 1.093 1.046
BIC 512.9 690.9 486.2 662.3
Treatment and time dummies included. Clustered robust s.e. in parentheses.
OLS and GLM for the binomial family (link function: logit): for GLM models, the table reports marginal effects.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
Table B2
Comparison of ATT in different prisons, models as in Table 5.
AVENAL MULE CREEK
Control Group: Model: ATT S.E N ATT S.E. N
Including altruism W (1) OLS 0.227⁄ (0.127) 74 0.198⁄ (0.109) 52
(2) GLM 0.208⁄⁄ (0.100) 74 0.181⁄⁄ (0.082) 52
N + W (3) OLS 0.175 (0.107) 98 0.230⁄⁄ (0.101) 60
(4) GLM 0.158⁄ (0.084) 98 0.205⁄⁄⁄ (0.074) 60
Including altruism & ethnic groups W (5) OLS 0.227⁄ (0.133) 74 0.198⁄ (0.116) 52
(6) GLM 0.198⁄⁄ (0.098) 74 0.176⁄⁄ (0.080) 52
N + W (7) OLS 0.175 (0.111) 98 0.230⁄⁄ (0.106) 60
(8) GLM 0.158⁄ (0.083) 98 0.199⁄⁄⁄ (0.072) 60
The table reports the estimated ATT in the two prisons taken separately.
The models are the same as in Table 5, including covariates (not reported here for reason of space), estimation techniques and clustered standard errors.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
Table B3
‘Extended’ Trust results including time-varying (t.v.) dictator: Diff-in-Diff.
Dep. Var.: Trust including t.v. dictator including t.v. dictator & ethnic groups
Control Group: W N + W W N + W
Model: OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ATT 0.123⁄ 0.115⁄ 0.104⁄ 0.096⁄ 0.105⁄ 0.092⁄ 0.129⁄ 0.116⁄
(0.066) (0.061) (0.058) (0.053) (0.060) (0.055) (0.068) (0.062)
T.v. dictator 0.674⁄⁄⁄ 0.727⁄⁄⁄ 0.674⁄⁄⁄ 0.742⁄⁄⁄ 0.660⁄⁄⁄ 0.731⁄⁄⁄ 0.630⁄⁄⁄ 0.689⁄⁄⁄
(0.085) (0.095) (0.071) (0.086) (0.073) (0.085) (0.090) (0.094)
Age 0.005⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.005⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄ 0.005 0.006⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Single 0.047 0.060 0.066⁄ 0.077⁄⁄ 0.067⁄ 0.070⁄ 0.056 0.057
(0.041) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.044) (0.045)
Prison dummy 0.082 0.090 0.077⁄ 0.086⁄ 0.065 0.074 0.050 0.055
(0.053) (0.055) (0.044) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.056) (0.058)
Soup value 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
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Table B3 (continued)
Dep. Var.: Trust including t.v. dictator including t.v. dictator & ethnic groups
Control Group: W N + W W N + W
Model: OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
White 0.033 0.037 0.062 0.057
(0.046) (0.052) (0.053) (0.055)
Native American/ 0.002 0.011 0.077 0.053
Alaska (0.080) (0.066) (0.104) (0.102)
Hawaiian Native/ 0.008 0.054 0.049 0.015
Pacific (0.099) (0.153) (0.111) (0.150)
Asian 0.041 0.047 0.067 0.092
(0.064) (0.084) (0.115) (0.148)
Black/ 0.050 0.035 0.041 0.036
African American (0.045) (0.056) (0.048) (0.060)
Hispanic/ 0.042 0.055 0.070 0.078
Latino (0.046) (0.053) (0.053) (0.059)
Observations 126 126 158 158 158 158 126 126
Adj. R-Squared 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.44
Mc-Fadden R-Sq. 0.39 0.23 0.24 0.39
AIC 0.896 0.862 0.930 0.979
BIC 531 712.9 683.8 503.5
Treatment and time dummies included. Clustered robust s.e. in parentheses.
OLS and GLM for the binomial family (link function: logit): for GLM models, the table reports marginal effects.
⁄ p < .10.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
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See Table C1 and Fig. C.1.Table C1

























Note: Logit estimation, marginal effects reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁄⁄ p < .05.
⁄⁄⁄ p < .01.
⁄ p < .10.




Fig. C.1. Estimated propensity scores: common support.
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See Figs. D.1 and D.2.Fig. D.1. Power analysis: minimum detectable effect size of trust.
Fig. D.2. Power analysis: minimum detectable effect size of dictator.
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.
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